Third World Legal Studies
Volume 13 Women's Rights and Traditional Law: A
Conflict

Article 7

1-7-1995

Women, Custom, and State Law in Papua New
Guinea
Jean G. Zorn

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls

Recommended Citation
Zorn, Jean G. (1995) "Women, Custom, and State Law in Papua New Guinea," Third World Legal Studies: Vol. 13, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls/vol13/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Third World Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

WOMEN, CUSTOM AND STATE LAW IN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Jean G. Zorn*
This is the story of Wagi Non, a woman who lives in the Western
Highlands of Papua New Guinea. No, that is not quite true. This is
only a small part of her story--the part in which the law took an
interest. I am tempted to say that I know Wagi Non well enough to
imagine the rest of her story, but that is only because I know women
like her, women who live in the great valleys of Papua New Guinea's
central mountains. I can imagine the thatched hut in which she lives,
she and her children on one side, her husband's pigs penned on the
other. I can recall the weight of the sky that she wakes to each
morning, an enormous bowl of blue, scudded with clouds, awesome,
yet seemingly touchablefrom the high valley floor. I can imagine her
joining other women in the village to hike down the steep hillside to
the river, babies and laundry in bilums (string bags) on their backs,
or weeding her gardens, or sitting at noonday under a tree with a
group of villagers, teasing, laughing, discussing, evaluating the latest
village scandal or conundrum.
Based on the Highlands women whom I know, I expect that, as a
girl, Wagi Non helped in the garden, carried small children on her
hip, shooed the pigs away from the sweet potatoes. If she did what
was expected of her, she married young, and to someone not in her
father's clan. Upon marriage, she moved to her husband's village, a
place full of strangers where she, a member of an unrelated clan,
might never feel quite at home. Probably, however, her husbandwas
young, and she was his only wife, because older men don't command
the power they once did, and very few can afford more than one wife
today. If she was lucky, the village was still traditional enough so
that, as a wife, she would have a house of her own. Her husband

'Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law at Queens College. Grateful
acknowledgement for help with this article are due to Stephen Zorn, Penny Andrews, John Webb, Eve
Rannels, Librarian at the University of Papua New Guinea Law Library, my students in the Custom and
Customary Law course at the Pacific Law Unit of the University of the South Pacific, and the women of
Papua New Guinea.
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would live in the men's house, visiting her only for the occasional
meal orfor sex when it was allowed, which was not often, never when
she was nursing or menstruating, seldom otherwise, because it is
incumbent upon Highlands men not to waste their bodily fluids, the
source of their strength and manliness. More likely though, she and
her husband lived in one of today's missionized villages, sharing the
same small quarters, too close together too often, particularly if he'd
been drinking, or angry at her for ignoring his mother's garden in
favor of her own, or if she were angry at him for spending the coffee
money she'd hoped to use for the children's school fees or a bolt of
cloth.
I. The Case of Wagi Non
No, it is not true to say that I know Wagi Non. I do not know
the particularities that make her who she is-precisely how old she is,
whether she is tall or short, outgoing or quiet, sunny or serious, hardworking or carefree. All I know of her is what a judge of Papua New
Guinea's National Court cared to tell us about her in his decision
reviewing the actions of one of Papua New Guinea's Village Courts.'
Wagi Non had been "taken to the Village Court at Kerep on a
complaint from relatives of her husband that she had committed
adultery. She was ordered to pay compensation. However, she was
unable to pay the amount2 ordered and was therefore ordered to be
imprisoned for 32 weeks."
The National Court's decision (and, therefore, this article) omit
much that we might want to know about Wagi Non's circumstances.
The decision does not say (and, therefore, I cannot tell you) how long
Wagi Non and her husband (who is never named in the decision) had
been married, whether the marriage was arranged by their parents or

'The Application of Wagi Non and In the Matter of the Constitution S. 42(5), unreported National
Court judgment N959 (1991) (hereafter Application of Wagi Non). The National Court is Papua New
Guinea's highest-level trial court. Appeals from it go to the Supreme Court. In addition to conducting
civil and criminal trials, judges of the National Court also hear appeals from the lower courts--the Village
Courts, Local Courts and District Courts.
2
Application of Wagi Non is a four-page mimeographed decision. I quote from it often in this article,
and will not include page references to the unreported decision.
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chosen by themselves, or whether there had ever been love or
friendship between them. We are told only that they were "properly
married.. .according to custom" and that the marriage had lasted long
enough to produce four children before her husband left their village
in the Highlands to seek plantation work far away on the island of New
Britain. Nor does the opinion tell us anything about Wagi Non's
alleged adultery, not who the man was nor whether it was a serious or
casual relationship nor for how long the affair had lasted. The opinion
does say that her husband had been away for five or six years, during
which time he had left his wife and children in the care of his relatives,
but had neither sent money to her nor visited her. It was not he who
brought the complaint against her; it was his relatives, the folks who
had been left to take care of her and her children, who (in the pidgin
phrase) "courted" her. The Papua New Guinea Village Courts are
customary courts, using custom (rather than state statutes or the
common law) to resolve the disputes that villagers bring to them, so we
must presume that, when the Village Court ordered Wagi Non to pay
compensation to her husband's relatives, the magistrates believed that
they were acting according to custom. When she could not pay the
ordered compensation, the Village Court had her imprisoned, because,
as the chairman (the chief magistrate) explained to the National Court,
"it is not a good idea for the husband to desert his family for that long
a period, but the wife was well looked after by the brothers of the
husband, and the adultery is not a good thing to do in the eyes of
others.'"
A judge of the National Court, on a routine visit to the prison,
found Wagi Non among the inmates. He ordered an immediate hearing
to review the Village Court's decision, and, after taking evidence from
the chairman of the Village Court, determined that Wagi Non should
be set free. The central fact causing the judge to disagree with the
Village Court's disposition of the case was the husband's inexplicably
long absence, which the judge characterized as desertion:
"I cannot help feeling that the going off and leaving the wife and

children without his support and protection, yet expecting her to
remain bound by custom, is a custom that must be denigrating to
her status as a woman. It is denying her the equality provided in
the Constitution s. 55. ...The Village Courts must recognize the
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nature of the changes in Papua New Guinea and that the
enforcement of custom must not conflict with the principles and
rights given in the Constitution.... Customs that denigrate women
should be denied a place in the underlying law in Papua New
Guinea because they conflict with the National Goals of equality
and participation which have been laid down clearly in the
Constitution.
The husband's desertion, the judge found, called into question the
fairness of a customary rule requiring wives, at all costs, to remain
faithful. Indeed, the judge doubted that a rule so inequitable, a rule
that holds a woman "bonded almost in slavery to the husband even
when the husband neglects her," can any longer be a valid rule of
custom. Moreover, the judge wondered how the Village Court could
have proceeded with the case in the husband's absence, given that
adultery is a wrong against a spouse, not against the spouse's family.
The National Court judge held that, by failing to take account of
the husband's desertion, the Village Court had acted
unconstitutionally. 3 Wagi Non's imprisonment violated both Section
55 of the Papua New Guinea Constitution, which provides that "all
citizens have the same rights, privileges, obligations and duties
irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour,
creed, religion or sex," and the National Goals, which are set forth in
the Preamble to the Constitution and which call for "all citizens to have
an equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the development
of our country."4

'nThe National Court also held that the Village Court had acted in contravention of Papua New
Guinea's Adultery and Enticement Act 1988. This is discussed at Part 1V.D below.
'The Constitution declares at Sec. 25(1) that the National Goals are "non-justiciable" and most
commentators have taken this to mean that the National Goals are unenforceable and that the courts cannot
refer to them in reaching decisions. See, for example, D. Johnson, "Aspects of the Legal Status of Women
in Papua New Guinea: A Working Paper," 7 Melanesian L.J 5, at 10 (1979); 0. Jessep, "The GovernorGeneral's Wives: Polygamy and the Recognition of Customary Marriage in Papua New Guinea,"
AustralianJ of Family Law 29, at 37-38. However, the Constitution would be better served were the
word "non-justiciable" to be interpreted to mean merely that the Government cannot be sued for failing
to take positive action to carry out a National Goal (for example, for failing to provide perfect, universal
health care or educational opportunities) but that laws and the actions of government agencies could be
voided in court if they conflicted with the National Goals.
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At first blush, it seems that the Village and National Courts did not
disagree about what the customary rules on adultery are (or, at least,
were). Where they seemed to disagree is on the validity of those rules
today. The Village Court seems to have believed that, in ordering
Wagi Non's incarceration, it was merely following the dictates of
custom. The National Court seems to have held that these customs are
not acceptable in contemporary society and under state law. If this is
the lesson to be drawn from the case, then one is led to unwelcome
conclusions: first, as demonstrated by the Village Court's willingness
to consign Wagi Non to prison, customs which are "denigrating to her
status as a woman" are still widely observed in Papua New Guinea;
and, second, state law offers women their best (perhaps their only)
hope of escaping from the inequities of custom. If so, then the
position of women in Papua New Guinea is a perilous one, because,
despite the supposed superiority of state law, it is a slim reed with
which to counter the ingrained authority of customs that people have
followed for centuries.
II. Gender Inequality in Papua New Guinea
I write about Wagi Non not because her story is unique, but
because it is not. Wagi Non was one of three Highlands women whom
the National Court judge freed from prison that month.5 Each of them
had been brought to a Village Court on charges of adultery, ordered to
pay compensation and imprisoned when she did not pay it. "That is
often to be expected," the judge said about the failure to pay, "Where
can she get the money as she is not the breadwinner of the family, her
husband is."6 In 1990, the year Wagi Non was sent to prison, "over
50 complaints were made to the National Court in Mt. Hagen [the
capital of the Western Highlands Province] of women being unfairly
and harshly treated by Village Courts and sent to jail for marital
matters."7 The judges of the National Court ordered at least forty-four
women released from incarceration, noting that "This is quite a large
5The Application of Thesia Maip and In the Matter of the ConstitutionS. 42(5), [1991] PNGLR 80;
In the Matter of Kaka Ruk and in the Matter of the ConstitutionS. 42(5) [1991] PNGLR 105.
"In the Matter of Kaka Ruk and in the Matter of the Constitution S. 42(5) [1991] PNGLR 105, at 105.
'H. Joku, "Highlands Women have been unfairly treated by village courts - PNG judges," The Times
of Papua New Guinea, p. 2 (July 18, 1991).
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number of cases which in the end appear to be clear discrimination or
harsh application of customary laws against women. '0 A number of
the cases involved women who had been accused of adultery
"following desertion or ill-treatment where the wife is ordered to pay
compensation but of course because the wife does not have money she
is unable to pay the compensation and therefore ends up in jail."9
Others involved women who had been fined for attempting to leave
1
their husbands "after being badly treated or being deserted."'
The judges thought the problem so severe that they highlighted it
in their 1990 Annual Report:
It is clear there are serious problems existing in the Highlands with
respect to family law.... Women are still in a subservient situation,
they are not safe unless they have a man to protect them. Men can
have several wives and new girlfriends, however, women cannot
have several husbands nor mix with other men.... There is no
consideration in any breakdown of marriage for the men's neglect
or their desertion or their mistreatment.... Men treat women clearly
as property and when women wish to exercise their equal rights
guaranteed under the Constitution, men create trouble.... The
human rights guaranteed under the Constitution are a dead letter for
the women in many areas of the Highlands and there is no attempt
being made by men and especially by men in positions of power
and influence and with modem education to attempt to come to
terms with this. The National Court is waging a lone battle to try
and bring some meaning and some purpose of the full intent of the
Constitution to the people."

'Papua New Guinea Supreme Court, Annual Report by the Judges 1990, p. 7 (Port Moresby:
Government Printing Office, 1991). Other cases in which National Court judges freed women who had
been imprisoned for failing to obey the orders of Village Courts included In re Yongo Mondo and the
Constitution S. 42(5), unreported National Court judgment N707 (1989), overruled in Supreme Court
Reference No. 2 of 1989, re Village Courts Act (c44) [19881 PNGLR 491; Application of Rita Raima and
In the Matter of the Constitution S. 42(5), unreported April 15, 1991; Application of Epem Mainu and In
the Matter of the Constitution S. 42(5), unrepoted April 17, 1991; Application of Kumi Kas and the
Constitution S. 42(5), unreported April 17, 1991.
'Ibid.
"'Ibid. See also F. Senge, "National Court frees village court 'victims', Papua New Guinea PostCourier, p. 1 (May 10, 1991); J. Bengi, "Seven village court victims freed," he Times of Papua New
Guinea, p. I (May 30, 1991).
"Papua New Guinea Supreme Court, Annual Report by the Judges 1990, supra, p. 8.
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Given the general situation of women in Papua New Guinea today,
perhaps the judges ought not to have been surprised at the treatment of
women in the Village Courts. Women lag far behind men on every
economic or social indicator. Although state-run primary schools are
theoretically open to all children whose parents can afford the fees (the
fees, while modest, are a burden in a nation where more than 80
percent of the population derive their living primarily from subsistence
gardening, fishing and hunting, supplemented by small plots of coffee
or other cash crops or the occasional trips to the market in town to sell
vegetables or handcrafts), far more boys than girls graduate from
primary school, and the gap widens through high school and
university.12 The educational disparity results in an educated elite that
is primarily male. It takes little more than the fingers of two hands to
count up the number of women who are in the management ranks in
business or the public service. Only two women have served in the
Papua New Guinea Parliament since the country became independent
twenty years ago. There has been only one woman judge of the
National Court.
But it is not just a matter of Papua New Guinean women lagging
behind in economics or politics. Women are all too frequently the
victims of physical abuse. Domestic violence (Papua New Guineans
call it "wife bashing") is so widespread, both amongst Papua New
Guineans living in traditional rural villages and those who have moved
into the towns, that women's groups mounted a massive campaign
against it a few years ago. While the campaign, which is still going
on, may have sensitized some clergy, police officers, magistrates and
judges to the problem, it has not markedly decreased the rate of
domestic violence. 13
Violent crimes (felony murders, armed
robberies, burglaries accompanied by violence, automobile hijackings)
are endemic and increasing in Papua New Guinea's towns, and
spreading to its rural villages, and rape seems to accompany the crime

"D. Johnson, "Aspects of the Legal Status of Women in Papua New Guinea: A Working Paper," 7
Melanesian L.J 5, at 28-29 (1979) and sources cited therein.
" .Tot, "Marital Violence in Port Moresby: Two Urban Case Studies," in Susan Tort (ed.) Domestic
Violence in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea,
Monograph No. 3, 1985) pp. 14-31; R. Waram, "Change attitudes, not law: Chan," Papua New Guinea
Post-Courier,p. 4 (July 7, 1995); B. Masike, "Govemment has failed us, women say at meeting," Papua
New Guinea Post-Courier,p. 4 (July 7, 1995).
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whenever a woman is the victim. Some commentators have suggested
that rape is, even more than money, a primary aim of many of the
crimes committed4 by Papua New Guinea's "rascals" (the local term for
criminal gangs).'
The widespread and pervasive denigration of women may have
seemed to the judges to be beyond the reach of merely legal solutions,
but the behavior of the Village Courts towards women could be
changed by judicial intervention. After all, in the hierarchy of Papua
New Guinea's court system, the Village Courts are directly answerable
to the District Courts, and ultimately under the authority of the
National Court and Supreme Court.' 5
16
III. The Enigma of Custom

Two things, I think, most disturbed the judges about the Village
Courts' inequitable and harsh treatment of women. First, the judges
were horrified to find that courts (the institutions of which they
themselves are a part, the institutions that are supposed to enforce the
law equitably) were involved in discriminatory behavior. Second, the
Village Courts claimed that they were making their decisions to send
these women to prison on the authority of Papua New Guinea's
indigenous norms and values-its customary law. The development of
Papua New Guinea's state legal system since the colonial period can
be viewed as a battle for supremacy between custom and the

4
Marc Shiltz, "Rascalism: Tradition and the State in Papua New Guinea," in Susan Toft (ed.) Domestic
Violence in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea,
Monograph No. 3, 1985) pp. 141-160.
"Village Courts Act 1989.
'l shall use the term "custom" in this article to refer to the norms and values that guide the behavior
of villagers in Papua New Guinea-both those norms and values that have existed since the days before
colonization and newer norms and values that people have developed as their circumstances have changed.
The major differentiation I am making here is between customary norms, those that arise out of lived
culture, and state norms, those that are the product of government agencies, such as Parliament or courts.
I am not entirely happy with the term. I should prefer to use the phrase "customary law" in order to
emphasize that, although these norms do not come from the state, they are equal to state law in their ability
to influence people and that the peoples of Papua New Guinea had well-developed legal systems, even
without formal legislation, courts, or police, prior to colonization. However, the phrase "customary law"
has also come to mean those aspects of custom that have been adopted by state courts, so, in order to avoid
confusion, I shall use it only in that sense in this article.
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introduced English common law, with the National Court judges
frequently criticized for too easily preferring the common law, and for
ignoring (or being ignorant of) homegrown custom. Custom had
generally seemed to be losing the battle, but at least it had, in the view
of the more progressive observers of Papua New Guinea, right on its
side-until now. Now, all of us who believed that custom, rather than
the introduced laws of England, should form the basis for Papua New
Guinea's legal system were confronted with cases in which custom
seemed to be in the wrong.
Custom is widely credited--by judges, by scholars, in the
newspapers, in tea-break conversations everywhere in Papua New
Guinea-not only with forcing women like Wagi Non into the choice
between a useless marriage and jail, but with all the other sins
perpetrated upon women in modern Papua New Guinea. Many people
in Papua New Guinea (including the women who spearheaded the
campaign against domestic violence) believe that men bash their wives
because custom has always supported men's right to do so. Most
people presume that, when rascals commit pack-rape on women, they
are merely copying the customary behavior of their grandfathers in
long-ago tribal wars. And most people are sure that the country's
failure to educate its women and to offer them meaningful employment
is rooted in the customary division of labor between the sexes, wherein
women worked the gardens while men engaged in war and politics.
The result of this kind of analogizing has been to put many
rightthinking people into a quandary. Generally, there is a sizeable overlap
between those who support the increased use of custom in the legal
system and those who promote better treatment for women. When
custom seems to be supporting the denigration of women, should we
be supporting women's rights (at the expense of custom) or custom at
the expense of women's rights? In addition, it is widely held (probably
with justification) that values and behaviors that spring from custom
are so ingrained into the social fabric as to be almost irreversible, a
belief that leads us to despair of the attempt to change attitudes and
actions before we even begin.
The decisions of the National Court in the cases of Wagi Non and
her sisters seem to support the assumption that custom discriminates
against women whereas state law redresses their wrongs and gives them
equal status. It is certainly easy to cast the cases in that light, to retell
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them as the stories of National Court judges, armed with the
Constitution and state statutes, riding in to save women imprisoned by
custom-and thereby to use the cases as further proof of custom's
failure to protect and provide for women. But that is not an entirely
accurate representation either of custom or of state law. Custom, as it
existed in pre-colonial times, may or may not have discriminated
against women. From the vantage point of today, looking back to the
pre-colonial villages of 100 years ago, we simply cannot be sure. And,
even if it did, so much has happened since, so many newer legal
modes--colonial law, customary law, state law-have engrafted
themselves onto custom that we cannot be sure which is the principal
source of the values and attitudes of today's society.
The first problem in determining the source of discrimination
against women is in defining what we mean by discrimination. I am
not at all sure that we would know how to define discrimination, construct it, recognize it in the very different cultures of pre-colonial
Papua New Guinea.17 Those who believe that the pre-colonial
societies in the Papua New Guinea Highlands were discriminatory
generally point to specific customs such as polygamy, brideprice,
virilocal residence and the division of labor that deprived women of a
voice in public affairs as examples of discrimination. They point out
that men could have several wives; women could not have several
husbands. They see brideprice as a way of buying women, so that
women, their labor and their children became the property of their
husbands' families. They note that women, especially those who came
from enemy clans, could expect little support or protection, let alone
understanding and sympathy, when they set up housekeeping in the
village of their husband's clan. Finally, they argue that, when men run
things, when women are excluded even from speaking out at clan

"Papua New Guinea is a land of so many different societies, each with its own customs-some
patrilineal, some matrilineal; some chiefly, some not; some requiring the payment of brideprice by the
groom's family, others not; some obviously honoring and supporting women, others seemingly not-that
it is impossible to reach conclusions that would apply to every Papua New Guinean group. I confine
myself in this article (as the judges did in their critique of the Village Courts) to the Highlands area, where
societies tended to be similarly patrilineal and patrilocal, depending for leadership on big men who
achieved that status rather than upon chiefs who inherited their authority, but even within this area, there
are differences. Not everything that I'll say in this article will apply to every Highlands village or clan.
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gatherings, things tend to get run the way men, not women, want them
to be run.' 8
However, it is equally possible to see each of these customs as
benign, even beneficent to women. While polygamy can foster
jealousy among wives or leave one wife unattended to, it can also
provide women with companions to share friendship and the workload.
Brideprice, particularly in Highlands societies, where the bride's family
is expected to reciprocate, may not be a one-way transaction, in which
the groom buys himself a bride, but the beginning of a lifelong series
of exchanges, through which two families cement a relationship of
mutual assistance. The dangers to women of virilocal residence (a
custom not exactly unknown in European society either) are undercut
by the fact that a husband's clan will be concerned for the welfare of
their women who marry and move away. Wagi Non's in-laws would
treat her as well as they expected their daughters to be treated in their
husbands' villages. Finally, while it is true that women did not speak
at men's meetings, it was equally true that men did not interfere in
women's activities, and who is to say which was the more important?
It is our own society that glorifies the male sphere of work and politics
over the female sphere, and we risk ethnocentrism by presuming that
all non-state and non-industrial societies do the same.
There is no doubt that women were treated differently from men
in pre-colonial Papua New Guinea. Men made war; women made
babies and gardens. But discrimination means more than merely
differential treatment. Feminist theory, for the most part, applauds the
recognition of difference. It is only when differences are used to
promote inequality, when difference is used as the excuse for
permitting one group access to desired goods and statuses and denying
access to another group, that discrimination can be said to exist. It is
not at all clear that this was the situation in pre-colonial Papua New
Guinea.

"See, for example, S.C. Bradley, "Attitudes and Practices Relating to Marital Violence among the
Tolai of East New Britain," in Susan Toil (ed.) Domestic Violence in PapuaNew Guinea (Port Moresby:
Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, Monograph No. 3, 1985) pp. 32-71; A. Chowning, "Kove
Women and Violence: The Context of Wife-Beating in a West New Britain Society," in Susan Toil (ed.)
Domestic Violence in PapuaNew Guinea (Port Moresby: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea,
Monograph No. 3, 1985) pp. 72-91.
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Moreover, one cannot conclude that discrimination existed in a
given culture based merely on the existence of customs that operate in
some cultures in a discriminatory way. Customs take on meaning and
effect from the culture in which they occur, and the same custom will
therefore have different consequences in different cultural settings. A
custom that is discriminatory in one culture (i.e., a custom that operates
to deny women access to goods, services, jobs, status, education or
respect) may not be discriminatory in another culture. For example,
the requirement that men pay brideprice for their wives discriminates
against women in modern Papua New Guinea, because it is viewed as
the payment by a man for the household services, children, sexual
favors and respect of a women. Today, men pay money for their
wives, a market transaction distressingly similar to buying a car or a
mango. In pre-colonial times, however, the full brideprice cycle in
most Papua New Guinean societies consisted of a series of exchanges
between the families of the bride and groom, and the goods exchanged
did not include money. In that situation, women were not necessarily
viewed as commodities for purchase, but as the not unimportant nexus
of significant clan and lineage ties.
That having been said, it is nevertheless true that some Highlands
cultures fostered a high level of distrust and dislike across gender lines,
and that this not infrequently led to violence against women. In many
Highlands societies (unlike those on the coast or islands), sex,
particularly for a young man, was considered a spilling of the soul, a
waste of the fluids that a man needed to succeed in battle or oratory.
Women were looked upon by men as the dangerous other, continually
enticing them into spilling those vital fluids. Mervyn and Joan
Meggitt, anthropologists who lived among the Enga in the mid-1950s,
close enough to first contact so as almost to qualify as people who
knew the Enga before they were truly colonized, report that discussions
by the men of adultery uncovered the antagonism with which Enga
men regarded women.' 9 Informants seemed to take an angry delight
in describing the horrible tortures-the removal of her nose, burning
sticks thrust up her genitals, death-that would be inflicted on any
" M. Meggitt, "Injured Husbands and Wounded Wives:
AustralianJournal ofAnthropology (1990) pp. 96-109.

Mae Enga Responses to Adultery," The
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woman caught having sex with someone other than her husband. Nor
was it only talk. The Meggitts did observe a number of women
bearing the scars and mutilations inflicted by angry husbands.
Unfortunately, though the Meggitts tell us what men said about women
who committed adultery, they do not tell us what women said about
men. (Indeed, much of what we think we know about pre-colonial
cultures is in the writings of male anthropologists who interviewed and
interacted with male informants. Without the female viewpoint, we
cannot be sure that we have the total picture of these cultures.)
Nevertheless, reports by the Meggitts and others suggest the existence
of deep divisions between the sexes and a high degree of male anger
displaced upon women-attitudes that, if they have not changed, could
be among the sources for the unequal treatment of women today.
But the sources of inequity have multiplied since the 1950s. Enga,
like other Highlands Provinces, has been forcibly opened up to
colonialism, coffee, Christianity, colonial law and state law.
Highlanders have had fifty years of colonialism and post-colonialism
in which to learn how to discriminate against women. Moreover, as
customs have been recognized by state courts and adopted into law
(becoming, in the process, customary law), it has been primarily men
doing the recognizing and adopting. It may be that .the customs that
have survived as customary law through the colonial period and into
statehood reflect male attitudes more than they reflect the actual state
of affairs in pre-colonial villages. Today's "customs" are as much a
product of the colonial and post-colonial periods as they are of the precolonial era. Women in Papua New Guinea today are truly, in Marilyn
Strathern's phrase, women inbetween-inbetween custom and
customary law, custom and state law, the traditional village and the
new, discrimination and equality.
IV. Village Courts and the National Court
It is, at best, an over-simplification to assume that the treatment of
women in Papua New Guinea today is a product solely, or even
primarily, of custom. Too many strands have been woven into the
fabric of social life, each overlaying and interacting with the others, to
make it possible to ascribe sole responsibility to any one. Similarly,
it is not accurate to characterize cases such as that of Wagi Non simply
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as examples of custom or customary institutions bested or chastised by
state law or state institutions. It is possible only at the most superficial
level to view the National Court, which freed Wagi Non, as a purely
state institution and the Village Court, which incarcerated her, as a
customary one. It is true that the National Court is a creature of state
law, a descendant of the old colonial Supreme Court, and that the
primary work of the National Court justices is to enforce and apply
state law, including the Papua New Guinea Constitution, the statutes
(particularly the Criminal Code and the Summary Offences Act)
enacted by Parliament, and the common law inherited during the
colonial period. It is also true that the Village Courts were intended
to apply customary law, that the magistrates of the Village Courts are
not trained as lawyers or judges but are village leaders, purportedly
wise in the ways of custom, and that the Village Court magistrates are
not supposed to adjudicate disputes or issue orders binding the parties
until they have first tried to achieve a mediated settlement.
A. Courts Are State Agencies
However, the easy dichotomy between the National Court as a
state or formal court and Village Courts as customary or informal
courts breaks down quickly under scrutiny. Both the National Court
and the Village Courts are state-created entities: neither would exist
if the Constitution or a statute had not called them into being; the
officials of both depend upon the government for their authority, their
jurisdiction, and their salaries. Village Courts are integral parts of the
state court system. They siphon off many cases that would otherwise
go to the Local or District Courts. Moreover, all decisions of the
Village Courts are reviewable by District Court magistrates, whether
or not the parties to the decision want to appeal. No imprisonment
order of a Village Court can be effected unless it is countersigned by
a District Court magistrate, which means, in Wagi Non's case, that a
District Court magistrate joined the Village Court magistrates in
responsibility for her imprisonment.
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B. The National Court Applies Customary Law
Nor is it entirely accurate to say that the National Court applies
only state law. The Constitution charges all state courts (and, in
particular, the National Court and Supreme Court) with the duty to
formulate for Papua New Guinea "appropriate rule[s] as part of the
underlying law" (which is to be Papua New Guinea's homegrown
common law, given a new name to distinguish it from the imported
English common law). Schedule 2.3 of the Constitution tells the courts
that, when no rule exists for deciding a case, they should create a rule,
which will then become the underlying law, "having regard to" the
Constitution itself (and, in particular, to the statements contained in the
Constitution relating to National Goals, Basic Social Obligations and
Basic Rights), relevant Papua New Guinean statutes and customs, the
statutes and judicial decisions of countries with legal systems similar
to that of Papua New Guinea, and "to the circumstances of the country
from time to time." The Constitution's insistence that the state courts
should look primarily to Papua New Guinean custom and
circumstances in formulating new rules for the underlying law is
emphasized in Schedule 2.1 of the Constitution, which provides that a
new rule need not be created if custom already contains a rule that
could be applicable to a case at hand, because "custom is adopted, and
shall be applied and enforced, as part of the underlying law." In effect,
the Constitution turns custom, to the extent that it is explicitly
recognized by the courts, into state law. Moreover, numerous statutes
require the National Court to apply customary law in specified
circumstances.2 °
In sorting out the fortunes of Wagi Non and other women in her
position, the National Court judge did not think he was merely
trumping custom with state law; he thought that it was the duty both
of the Village Courts and of the National Court to apply customary law
where applicable, that the Village Court magistrates had gone wrong
in their application of customary law, and that it therefore became his
task to set them right. The Village Court required Wagi Non to remain

"°Marriage Act (Ch. 280) Sec. 3; Customs Recognition Act (Ch. 19).
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as faithful as Penelope, but this contemporary Ulysses was making no
attempt to find his way home:
In the modem world, such behavior would be clearly desertion.
However, according to the customary law, it is suggested that
because she was put in the care of her husband's brothers and
relatives, she has not been deserted and has been adequately looked
after and is therefore still bound to him.... I am sure that in
traditional times the man could not leave his home for such long
periods and travel so far away, so problems of desertion never
existed in customary times. Today the Courts are now applying the
same rules without recognizing the difficulties and the obligations
of husbands when they do go off for such long periods. The
Village Courts must recognize the nature of the changes in Papua
New Guinea and that the enforcement of custom must not conflict
with the principles and rights given in the Constitution.
The judge may be saying here that there is a custom requiring
women to be faithful even when their husbands have deserted them and
that this customary rule cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. He
seems also to be saying, however, that the Village Court has
misinterpreted custom, applying a rule from a bygone era without
recognizing that customary norms change under the influence of
changing social conditions.
C. The Village Courts Apply State Law
Just as the National Court often applies (or, at least, is often
supposed to apply) customary law, so, too, the Village Courts often
apply state law. Village Courts perform two potentially conflicting
functions, operating both as popular dispute-settlement arenas and as
enforcers of the community's quasi-criminal norms. These two
functions do not coexist very well, but the Village Courts have been
obliged to play both roles from their conception in 1973 (two years
before Papua New Guinea achieved independence). There were two
purposes behind the move to create the Village Courts. Some officials
(Papua New Guineans for the most part, serving in Papua New
Guinea's first democratically elected legislature during the brief pre-
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independence self-government period) wanted there to be at least one
institution within the national legal system that would reflect customary
law and that would give legal recognition to the solutions arrived at
when Papua New Guinean villagers met to discuss and resolve
disputes. Other officials (most notably the Australian public servants
who then controlled the Office of the Secretary for Law and other
strategic institutions) saw village-level courts as a way to head off the
rising crime rate. These disparate impulses came together in the
Village Courts Act, which provides both that the Village Courts should
use customary law and customary mediation to resolve disputes and
that the Village Courts should punish persons who offend against
village norms and local government rules by imposing fines,
compensation, community service and, if those are not complied with,
jail.
There were no prisons in pre-colonial days. The sanctions for
adultery could be swift and cruel, but they never included
incarceration. An angry husband might decide to exact immediate
physical revenge on his wife or her lover (self-help was the first
available response of the cuckold in pre-colonial Papua New Guinea,
as it continues to be throughout most of the world today), or (fearing
that the families of his wife and her lover might respond to his
violence with self-help of their own) he might instead bring the matter
to a meeting or moot in the village. There, big men would try to
mediate the dispute; friends and relatives would offer advice,
encouragement to both sides, or evidence about the illicit affair and,
perhaps, about the sins of the husband that had led his wife to prefer
another. Orators might speak at length, reminding the participants that
there were important values and alliances that could be irretrievably
disrupted if the matter was not amicably settled. The spirits would be
called upon, either to clear up factual disagreements or to exact
sanctions of their own. Despite the elders' advice, tempers might rise,
leading to the violence that cooler heads had hoped to prevent, or a
settlement might be reached and compensation paid (usually by both
sides, so that no one could go away openly nursing a grudge).
Although the National Court and the Village Courts can both be
said to be creations of the state, and although both apply the rules of
customary law and of state law, neither can be said to Operate in the
fashion in which custom would act in the absence of state intervention.
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The Village Courts Act provides that magistrates should attempt to
mediate disputes before adjudicating them, but few in practice do so.
Many village disputes are resolved in the customary ways (not only by
mediation, but also by personal violence and clan warfare, despite state
criminal penalties for the latter), but mediation, when it occurs,
generally tends to happen outside the rubric of the Village Courts,
many of which have chosen to fashion their proceedings on the model
of the other state courts. Many villages have constructed Village Court
buildings, with a platform for the magistrates' table. The magistrates,
usually three to a case, hear evidence from both sides, quizzing the
parties and their witnesses, shushing anyone else who might want to
speak, and then briefly conferring amongst themselves before stating
their order and their reasons for it. There are, to be sure, aspects of
tradition in the conduct of Village Court hearings. Like elders or
orators, the magistrates frequently lecture participants about what they
should have done to conform to community norms and values. If a
party vociferously refuses to accept the court's judgment, the
magistrates may reconsider on the spot and permit a broader discussion
of the dispute. But the elements of community participation and a joint
party-centered search for a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute
are lacking or, at best, under cover, replaced by a magistrate-centered
proceeding that is more like the proceedings in other state courts than
like the traditional village moot.
D. The Adultery and Enticement Act
The National Court held that Wagi Non's imprisonment was
contrary not only to the Constitution but also to Papua New Guinea's
Adultery and Enticement Act. However, the judge was not holding
that the statute superseded custom; he was using the statute to reinforce
his view that the Village Court had applied custom wrongly. The
Adultery and Enticement Act was brought into force in 1988 to
accomplish two aims. It was intended both to decriminalize adultery
and to counteract 100 years of discriminatory treatment of Papua New
Guineans by the Australian colonial administration. Prior to the
passage of the Act, adultery had been a criminal offense under state
law, punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to six months.
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However, because the adultery laws had not been contained in the
Criminal Code or the Summary Offences Act, but in the Native
Regulations, which had been promulgated by the colonial
administration to rule the natives of Papua New Guinea, they had
applied only to native-born Papua New Guineans, and not to
naturalized citizens or foreigners. Under the Regulations, Wagi Non
could have been found guilty of adultery but an expatriate could not.
The Act, which repealed the Regulations, applies to everyone in Papua
New Guinea "regardless of customary differences, sex, or
nationality."21
In its decision in Wagi Non's case, the National Court focused on
the requirement in the Act that courts mediate adultery disputes:
The new Adultery and Enticement Act.. .puts strong emphasis on
mediation in adultery situations realizing that adultery situations
may have arisen out of other family problems. However, it is quite
clear that the Village Court has paid no heed to such considerations
in its dealing with this matter. There cannot have been any
attempted mediation because the husband was not there to discuss
the problem....
Technically, the Adultery and Enticement Act does not apply in
the Village Courts.22 If the National Court judge had wanted only to
remind the Village Court magistrates that they ought to have tried to
mediate this dispute, he could have referred them to the Village Courts
Act itself, which requires Village Courts to mediate all disputes before
holding formal hearings and issuing orders. He did not need to

2

The Act provides at Sec. 4 that a wronged spouse may bring a claim against the adulterous spouse,
the consort, or both. If the spouse proves his or her claim, Sections 12 to 16 of the Act provide that
damages of up to K1,000 (approximately US $750) may be awarded, the exact amount depending upon
such considerations as how much the defendants earn, any financial hardship that the damages award might
provoke, and whether customary compensation has been paid. For an overview and critique of the Act,
see 0. Jessep, "Compensation for Adultery in Papua New Guinea: The Adultery and Enticement Act
1988," 17 Melanesian L.J. 1-9 (1989).
22
As provided in Sec. 21 of the Adultery and Enticement Act, claims under the Act are supposed to
be brought to a Local or District Court, not to a Village Court. The Village Courts are not mentioned in
the Adultery and Enticement Act, and, under Section 58(1) of the Village Courts Act, the Village Courts
are bound only by the Constitution and those statutes that specifically refer to the Village Courts. Thus,
despite passage of the Act, Village Courts are still technically free to treat adultery as an act that violates
customary norms and to punish those who offend against those norms.
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mention an Act that they need not follow. I expect he chose to bring
the Adultery and Enticement Act to the attention of the Village Court
magistrates for two reasons. First, if Village Courts continue to make
incarceration orders in adultery cases, then Papua New Guinea would
still have two adultery laws applicable to different groups of people,
just as it did before the Act was passed. Only the make-up of the
groups would have changed. Papua New Guinean villagers who
commit adultery would be subject to imprisonment, whereas
townspeople would be subject only to the civil damages provided for
in the Adultery and Enticement Act.
The judge's second reason, I think, for referring to the Adultery
and Enticement Act was his perception that, by imprisoning women
found to have committed adultery, the Village Court was treating
adultery as a crime when, to his mind, they should, following the spirit
of the Act, treat it as a civil matter. The Village Court might have
believed it was merely underlining the importance of the customary
prohibition on adultery when it ordered Wagi Non to prison, but the
National Court saw a clear distinction between civil and criminal
matters, between matters that are resolved through compensation or
damages and those that result in incarceration. This is a distinction,
however, that does not exist in customary law.23
In a state society, it is generally presumed that the community will
demonstrate its abhorrence of certain acts by labelling them as criminal
and providing courts, police and jails to handle them. Pre-colonial
societies depended upon victims to seek their own recompense, not
because the community did not take the wrongs seriously, but because
non-state societies did not have courts, police or prisons. However,
victims did not go after the wrongdoer on their own. They looked to
their kin, fellow clan members and neighbors for support. Everyone
in the village would get involved in sorting out disputes and in righting
wrongs. No one could avoid personal responsibility by leaving these

"ilt used to be said that custom, by leaving it to the wronged party to seek his or her own recompense,
treated all wrongs as torts, as non-criminal, and one could almost hear the sniff of lawyerly disdain with
which this was said, as if customary peoples were somehow incapable of knowing when something was
wrong enough to be treated as a crime. But the artificial distinction made by the common law has never
been easy to grasp; even law students find it illogical, particularly when the same action can subject a
defendant both to criminal penalties and to a civil suit.
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vital community tasks up to the state. It could therefore be argued that
people in non-state societies treated wrongs more seriously, and took
more personal responsibility for resolving disputes, than people in state
societies do.
In denying that Wagi Non should be imprisoned, the judge was
making a statement not only about customary law but also about the
acceptable uses of the institutions of state law. He was pointing out
that, in state societies, courts have two roles: they serve the state,
sanctioning those who challenge the state by breaking its laws, but they
also serve as arbiters of private disputes, helping the parties to
reconcile their differences, much as village gatherings used to do. In
his view, adultery is a family matter, and family matters are private;
they do not usually involve a challenge to state authority and,
therefore, ought not often to invoke criminal penalties.
While I agree that Wagi Non ought not to have been jailed, I am
not sure that her freedom should turn on the distinction between public
and private matters. It is difficult to determine when a court should
limit itself to the role of arbiter of private disputes and when it is
speaking for the state. After all, it is itself an arm of the state and, as
such, is always speaking for the state. Its order, its decision in a case,
even in a case that concerns a family dispute, is an order of the state,
and a party's refusal to obey that order becomes a challenge to state
authority. Nor does one want to consign all "family problems" to the
realm of the private and non-criminal. In this situation, the distinction
helped Wagi Non to go free. In another, it could allow the husband
who beat or raped her to escape the consequences of his actions.
Privatizing women's concerns minimizes them, which does not help
women in the long run.
E. When Custom Becomes State Law
It is difficult (more, it is impossibly inaccurate and imprecise) to
say that custom imprisoned Wagi Non and that state law freed her.
One could, with somewhat more accuracy and precision, say that
custom imprisoned her and custom freed her, or that state law both
imprisoned her and set her free. Most accurately, one should say that,
twenty years after Papua New Guinea became an independent state, the
manifold actors in its legal system are still trying to work out the
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proper balance between customary law and state law, and more
mystified than ever as to what custom really is, a quest made more
difficult by the changing economic, social and political circumstances
of the country, circumstances which are affecting and changing the
meaning and impact of custom and state law, as well.
V. What is Customary about a Faithful Wife?
Although the holding in Wagi Non's case seems to be that the
customary rule applied by the Village Court is unconstitutional, at
different places in his opinion, the judge also seems to suggest that
there is no customary rule governing the case. There cannot now be
a rule in customary law requiring that a wife remain forever faithful to
a long-absent husband, he says, because "I am sure that in traditional
times the man could not leave his home for such long periods of time
and travel so far away so problems of desertion never existed in
customary times." The judge suggests that there might once have been
a rule that women should remain sexually faithful regardless of what
their husbands did, but it was a rule created for circumstances that no
longer exist: "Today the [Village] Courts are now applying the same
rules without recognizing the difficulties and the obligations of
husbands when they do go off for such long periods." If it is no
longer a rule of customary law, he seems to be suggesting, then the
Village Court ought not to be applying it, because the Village Courts
are supposed to apply custom as it actually exists, not as it once might
have been.
"The Village Courts," the judge says, "must recognize the nature
of the changes in Papua New Guinea and that the enforcement of
custom must not conflict with the principles and rights given in the
Constitution." It seems that the Highlands villagers have reacted to
"the changes in Papua New Guinea" by creating new customary norms,
but that these new norms are unconstitutional-and are so because of
"the changes in Papua New Guinea." Are the villagers' "changes" and
the Constitution's "changes" the same? Was the Village Court in Wagi
Non's case applying custom that is currently viable or was it reaching
back to the now dead customs of a bygone way of life? In answering
these questions, we may reach some understanding of what custom is
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and whether custom can still be said to exist in the face of the vast
changes that have occurred to Papua New Guinea's traditional cultures
as a result of colonialism and its aftermath.
The judge is probably correct in his surmise that men in the
Highlands did not travel far or long in pre-colonial times. Men who
lived on the coast and islands ventured far from home on trading
voyages that might last several months (and did not expect their wives
to practice total abstinence while they were gone). But, in the
Highlands, there were too many dangers from hostile clans just over
the next ridge, let alone from unknown enemies farther away, for men
to wander far from home. Mel, one of the legendary great men of the
Melpa of the Western Highlands, earned his fame and status in part by
daring to journey from his home in the Wahgi Valley into the Jimi to
collect bird of paradise feathers, but that renowned exploit, courageous
as it was, took several weeks, not many months or years.
Lengthy stays away from home became a Highlands practice only
during the colonial period. There is a nice symmetry in Wagi Non's
husband staying away in order to work on a plantation, because it was
the Australian planters who first separated Highlands families for
months at a time. The "boys" (who could be anywhere from 15 to 50)
hired to work on the plantations were bound by one-year contracts.
Government supported capital in the colonies: a worker's breach of his
contract--especially the dread breach of leaving before one's time was
up-was a criminal offense, punishable by flogging and imprisonment.
The colonial police would return runaway workers to the plantation.
(There were, of course, no concomitant penalties for breaches by
employers.)
Living conditions for workers on the plantations were not
conducive to family life. In fact, families were actively discouraged
from joining their husbands and fathers at or near the plantations.
Workers lived in dormitories, decidedly men-only accommodations; the
pay was insufficient to support a wife and children, unless the wife and
children stayed behind in the village, to be cared for by the husband's
family. Many men stayed at the job for only a year, returning home
with a little money, some bolts of cloth, an axe or a knife (the few
things that their meager pay enabled them to purchase), but there were
also men who signed on for longer, sometimes staying away from
home for years at a time.
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It was left to the folks in the village (and their menfolks) to adapt
to these new conditions as best they could. I have no doubt that they
did so in the way that people usually do--by modifying existing
customs to suit the changed circumstances. It had always been up to
a man's kin to care for his wife and children (dig out new gardens for
the wife to till, give them the husband's share of ceremonial pork,
repair their home when necessary) should he fall ill or die; no small
stretch to support them when he disappeared into plantation labor. It
would not be surprising that the husband was not heard from for
months at a time. Probably, there was no word of him until his return,
unless a co-worker from the same or a nearby village happened to
return earlier than he, bringing word of him. No one read or wrote
and, if they had, there was no one to deliver the mail. A wife whose
husband was away on a plantation would be expected to remain loyal
to her husband. After all, it was her husband's family who was taking
care of her and of her children. Moreover, in marrying, she had not
merely taken on a husband, she had taken on a new family, and a
responsibility to aid that family, to help to maintain its good name,
which she could do by acting the role of the faithful wife.
The ability of village people to adapt suited the interests of
expatriate colonial society well. If wives and children were supported
by the subsistence economy of the village, then there was no need to
pay men the high wages that Australians would demand, wages high
enough to support a family, and there was no need for housing, health
insurance, education, social services or any of the demands that
workers' families would make upon employers or government. If this
situation was caused by the colonizers, can it be called custohary?
There are different answers to this question, depending upon whether
one is an anthropologist or a lawyer, and on one's political perspective.
Anthropologists would probably say that it is customary, because
custom is no more than the way that people in a culture behave (or
think that they ought to behave) at any given time. Custom, the
anthropologist would say, is not just the norms and values that guided
behavior 100 years ago. Since custom is not enacted into unchangeable
written rules, since it is constantly made and remade by people acting
and reacting within the terms that they believe are set for them by their
culture, it consists, at any time, of the norms and values that guide
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behavior at that time. If new norms have developed in the Highlands
governing how wives should behave when their husbands are away,
then those are the customs that the courts must deal with.
Lawyers might be less certain that new customs can be accepted
as part of court-made customary law. Prior to independence and the
adoption of the Papua New Guinea Constitution, the aim of the
colonial courts (and the colonial administration in general) was to make
Papua New Guinea's laws and legal system just like those of Australia,
and to do so as quickly as possible, while still recognizing that Papua
New Guineans, untutored in the imported laws, could not always be
held accountable for acting according to custom. In this atmosphere,
the Customs Recognition Act (then called the Native Customs
Recognition Act) provided that the courts could recognize and apply
certain customs (most notably, those relating to land and family
matters, or those useful to the court in determining the appropriate
sentence for a criminal defendant), but only if the customs had "existed
from time immemorial. 24 This limitation on the recognition of
custom by the courts in the colonial period was excised by the
Constitution, which defines custom as
the customs and usages of indigenous inhabitants of the country
existing in relation to the matter in question at the time when and
the place in relation to which the matter arises, regardless of
whether or not the custom or usage has existed from time
immemorial.25
While this definition permits the courts to acknowledge that
cultures and customs change, it does not resolve all the problems that
confront a classically trained judge or lawyer in trying to determine
what is customary and what is not.
Since law does not consist merely of what people do but of what
someone (in the case of state-made law, the government) believes
people should do, then, in the judicial context, does custom consist
merely of what people do, or must it be limited to norms and values,
to what people think they should do? And, if the latter, which people's

4

Customs Recognition Act (Ch. 19).
New Guinea Constitution, Schedule 1.2(1).

25Papua
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norms are to be recognized? It seems that everyone whose opinion
mattered in Wagi Non's village (perhaps even including Wagi Non
herself) believed that women who commit adultery ought to be jailed
if they cannot pay the compensation demanded of them. But the
drafters of the Constitution did not think so. The judges of the
National Court do not think so. Many women, particularly educated
women, throughout the rest of Papua New Guinea do not think so. If
the court decides that this is not a custom, then is it depriving this
village (which, we must remember, was, until it was forcibly colonized,
an independent and self-governing polity) of its customary law? If the
court decides that this is a custom, will this custom then be enforced
upon the women who do not believe in it? Might it be enforced in
villages that do not follow it, or will Papua New Guinea have a
different law for every village, so that a woman's fate will depend
upon where she happens to be when a complaint is brought against
her?
For the villagers, the circumstances that changed (thereby changing
the import and effect of their customs) were the colonial invasion of
Papua New Guinea and the concomitant development of the plantation
system. Peter Fitzpatrick is among those who have said that the
colonizers so altered custom as to make it inaccurate to refer to
anything Papua New Guineans do today as customary. 6 While it is
possible to see many of the changes to custom that occurred during the
colonial period simply as a response by villagers to changes in politics
and economics, it is impossible not to recognize that the colonial
administration had a hand in channeling and directing the changes to
custom, whether directly or indirectly. For example, although young
men may have chosen to go away to the plantations, instead of
performing their traditional roles in the village, they made the choice
in circumstances engineered by the colonizers.
The colonial
administration made plantation work necessary by imposing taxes on
villagers, and it made plantation work seem desirable, by banning clan
warfare, which left many young men with nothing much useful to do
at home in the village.

26

1 P. Fitzpatrick, "Traditionalism and Traditional Law," 28 J. African Law 20 (1984).
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Fitzpatrick's insight is useful because, if nothing else, it enables us
to see that it is inaccurate to view Wagi Non's predicament simply as
a case of [bad] customs confronted by [good] state law. Her
incarceration (like most of the problems women are confronting in
Papua New Guinea today) is not the result of villagers clinging
obdurately to ancient and outmoded norms. It is the result of villagers
trying to come to terms with colonialism and statehood, re-inventing
their customs to make life possible under changing economic
conditions. The changes that the villagers see, the changes that find
voice in their emerging norms and values, are changes in their
relationship to the means of production and to the sources of political
power. The changes that the judge sees, the changes that causes him
to question their choices, are changes that have happened so far only
in words-the words of the Constitution, the words of the daily
newspapers.
V1. Equality and the Extended Family
The National Court presumes, without discussion, that the
wounded husband is the only party that the law should recognize as
having been injured by Wagi Non's adultery, that his family have no
standing in the matter:
[O]ne unusual feature of this matter is that it was not the husband
who made the complaint to the Village Court but it was the
husband's relatives. It would also appear that the husband never
had and still has no knowledge of what happened. Surely it is the
husband who is the aggrieved party....
Yet, it was his family who, as the Village Court magistrate tries
to point out to the judge, supported her and her children in her
husband's absence. It is clear that, under customary rules, they had
standing to complain about, and seek recompense for, her behavior.
Western family law, as exemplified in Papua New Guinea's
Marriage Act, is posited upon the ideal of a man and woman
voluntarily consenting to marry one another. Once they do, they are
expected to live together with their children as a nuclear family. Most
Western market economies (and, as a result, Papua New Guinea's cash
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economy) depend upon the continuing existence of the nuclear family.
Until the 1980s (when wages in most Western countries became too
low for a single breadwinner to support even the relatively small
demands of a nuclear family), wages were generally set at the amount
that would cover the needs of a man, one wife and children; they were
not sufficient to include too many other relatives, so households that
included grandparents, aunts and uncles or other family members were
frowned upon.27 The developing industrial economies of the West
depended upon a large pool of workers willing to travel wherever the
jobs were; a man encumbered only by a wife and children can pick up
stakes more lightly than can a man who is part of a large, extended
family. Adultery, in Western society, is a matter solely between the
husband and wife; it is a denial of the continuity of their monogamous
relationship.
In traditional Papua New Guinean cultures, marriage is not a
matter that concerns only the husband and wife. Two larger families
are involved. Since the married couple will reside either with the
husband's family or the wife's, their families expect to have some say
in who this new family member will be. In most of the Highlands,
women will live with their husbands' families, so there is much
concern about whether she will be a good worker and will produce the
children whose existence guarantees the continuity of the husband's
clan and lineage. The marriage signifies not just the advent of a new
relationship between a man and a woman, but also the creation of ties
between his clan and hers. Once related by marriage, members of the
two families will depend upon one another for trading and exchange
partners, as wartime allies, and as co-givers at feasts and funerals.
Marriage in the Highlands signifies the development of alliances that
aid the subsistence economy by bringing more workers into it, as well
as new avenues for ensuring the security of the family and for
obtaining needed goods.
Adultery in Papua New Guinea's traditional villages is an affront
not only against the husband but also against his family. In entering

"This may also explain the Western world's hostility to polygamy; so long as men were supposed to
be the sole breadwinners of the family, polygamy was feared because it might impel men to request higher
wages.
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the marriage, each spouse has bound himself or herself not only to the
other spouse but to their kin as well. In the patrilineal societies of the
Highlands, it is probably true that a woman owes more of an obligation
to her husband's family than he does to hers. By paying brideprice to
her kin, her husband's family has pledged to treat her as a member of
their own clan, and to care for her and her children. She expects to
count on the continuing support of her husband's family even after her
husband dies. In return, she owes them continuing fealty. If she did
commit adultery, Wagi Non failed in her duty not only to her husband
but also to his family. In deciding Wagi Non's case, however, the
National Court judge discounted the family's involvement, viewing his
abandonment and her adultery merely as "problems between the
husband and wife." In prohibiting Wagi Non's in-laws from pursuing
the complaint against her, the judge has changed the meaning of
customary family law, making it more like Western concepts of
marriage.
I expect that the judge did not do this without thinking through the
consequences. There is a reason in Papua New Guinea to break down
the old norms of customary marriage, and the reason lies in Papua New
Guinea's economy. If Papua New Guinea is to develop a market
economy on the Western capitalist model, as its leaders want it to do,
then it behooves it to subvert the traditional family structures, which
make it difficult for workers to move easily from job to far-off job and
which make prevailing (low) wages unattractively insufficient.
However, the court might also note that, to date, Papua New Guinea
has tried to use traditional family structures as a way to achieve
economic development more cheaply.
By depending upon the
extended family back in the village to take care of wives, children, the
old and the unemployed, the government has not found it necessary to
institute the social taxes common in other industrialized nations. Not
everyone in positions of economic power in Papua New Guinea would
be happy if customary obligations to and by the extended family were
done away with.
VII. Desertion, Polygyny and the Meaning of Equality
In the eyes of the National Court judge, the husband's fault in
being so long away is the central fact in Wagi Non's case. He was,
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the judge believed, the only person with standing to complain about
Wagi Non's affair. More importantly, because he was free to travel
while she was bound by customary rules of fealty, she was denied the
equal protection guaranteed by section 55 of the Constitution. Finally,
because she was required to be "bonded almost in slavery to the
husband even when the husband neglects her," the Village Court's
treatment of her conflicted with the "National Goals of equality and
participation."
It is easy to agree that what happened to Wagi Non was cruel.
But in precisely what ways did it deny her equality? The Annual
Report of the Judges for 1990, which commented upon Wagi Non's
case, makes it clearer:
Some men have left their wives for up to 6 years and have never
supported them or taken any interest in them back in the village.
Often the men have gone to the coastal towns for jobs or even far
island provinces. However, as soon as they hear that the wife has
decided to go with another man they rush home and take them to
court to seek compensation. Again it appears that there is one law
for men (they can take as many wives as they want, have as many
girlfriends as they want) and there is another law for women, they
clearly cannot associate with any other men.... Men can.. .desert
their wives for years, take a new wife elsewhere where they are
living, yet women are bonded almost in slavery back in the village
to those men, even if they give them no support.... Men treat
marriage so lightly and get new wives or girlfriends; they neglect
their older wives and this often leads to domestic strife....2s
The inequality arises because men can have second (or third---or
more) wives, and women cannot. When a man takes up with another
woman, it is called polygamy and is not considered unlawful; if a
woman takes up with another man, it is called adultery and is treated
as a crime. The judge never accuses Wagi Non's husband of having
taken up with another woman, but there are clear implications that he
might have. Who else has been doing his laundry for six years? And

21Papua New Guinea Supreme Court, Annual Report by the Judges 1990, supra, pp. 7-8.
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there is no suggestion that he has divorced Wagi Non; to the contrary,
his family still assumes that they are responsible for her-and she to
them. So we are left, as the judge seems to have been, with the
suspicion that Wagi Non's husband has a second wife far off in East
New Britain.
Polygamy was not uncommon in traditional Papua New Guinea,
and, although the missionaries frown on it, it is not unheard of in its
traditional form today. Christianity has had some impact in decreasing
the number of polygamous marriages, but economics has probably
played a greater role. Even in pre-colonial times, since marriage
required the payment of bridewealth, few men could afford a second
wife. However, once a man was able to afford additional wives, he
probably would try to find them. In addition to helping him (and his
other wives) to till more gardens and raise more pigs, each new wife
brought him the opportunity for expanding his alliances through
exchanges with her family. Today, there is less to be gained from (and
more cost involved) in adding additional wives to the family, especially
for men who live in town or who are heavily invested in cash
cropping.
It is, however, not uncommon in Papua New Guinea today for men
to have two wives, one in the village and another near where he works
in town. Sometimes the wives know about one another's existence;
sometimes they do not. Sometimes the man has married both wives by
custom; often, he has married his village wife according to custom and
his town wife in a church or civil ceremony; more often, though, he
has married his village wife according to custom, he and his town wife
live together without being in a relationship that the state would
recognize as a legal marriage.29
At least two questions are raised by the continuing existence of
polygamous unions. First, if (as the judges state in their Annual
Report and imply in the Wagi Non case) polygyny unconstitutionally
discriminates against women, why have the courts not taken the

"1'he Papua New Guinea Marriage Act recognizes the validity both of statutory marriages (marriages
performed by a person, including a member of the clergy, who is authorized to officiate at a statutory
marriage) and customary marriages (marriages that are entered into in accordance with the customs of the
parties). Nothing in the Act makes polygamous marriages illegal, so long as all of them are customary.
A person commits the crime of bigamy only if he or she has a spouse (either through a customary or a
statutory marriage) in addition to the spouse that he or she married under the statute.

200

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1994

opportunity to declare polygamous marriages unlawful? And, since the
possibility of polygamy inheres in most customary marriages in Papua
New Guinea, meaning that every woman in such a marriage is in an
unequal position, then are all customary marriages unconstitutional?
The judge in Wagi Non's case did not go so far as to declare
polygamy itself unconstitutional: "I am not saying that a man cannot
have several wives and travel but if he chooses to have wives and
travel elsewhere he must accord them equality in care and participation
and she must have the same freedoms that he has." The judge does not
say exactly how a husband might accomplish these objectives. But the
court is not alone in its uncertainty about what to do about polygyny.
In 1978, in a proposed redraft of the Marriage Act, intended to make
the statute, which had originally been imported with few changes from
Australia, conform more to the circumstances of Papua New Guinean
society, the Law Reform Commission did not suggest that polygamy
be entirely abandoned. 0 Women's groups in Papua New Guinea see
two sides to the issue. More recently, the Law Reform Commission,
propelled by many women's groups, did issue a report calling for the
abolition of polygamy.31 However, in 1991, when it was reported that
the newly-appointed Governor-General of Papua New Guinea had taken
only the second of his two wives to the installation ceremonies at
Buckingham Palace (so that she became a Lady, and his first wife did
not), the daily press quoted representatives of women's groups who
argued that both wives should be given the title. Although there is not
necessarily any conflict in wanting both to abolish polygamy and to
treat with respect women who are in polygamous marriages, the furor
caused by the Governor-General's gaffe did bring into stark relief the

"Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission, "Family Law" (Port Moresby: PNG Law Reform
Commission, Working Paper No. 9, 1978). For a critique, see H. McRae, "Reform of Family Law in
Papua New Guinea," in David Weisbrot, Abdul Paliwala and Aki Sawyerr (eds.) Law and Social Change
in Papua New Guinea (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), p. 132.
"Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission Task Force on Family Law Reform, "Press Release,"
June 20, 1990.
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conflicting emotions that swirl around the subject in Papua New
Guinea today.32
It is not clear whether polygamy contributed to women's inequality
in pre-colonial times. It is true that there is an inequity inherent in the
notion that men can have many wives, while women cannot have many
husbands, but there are those who argue that polygyny was downright
good for women.13 In a subsistence economy, where one's livelihood
depended upon access to gardens and where land allocation was
controlled by men, women prospered only if they were married, and
the woman married to a man with plenty of land prospered most, even
if she had to be one of several wives to do it. Highlands societies were
often at war, and women depended upon men for protection.
Certainly, in cultures such as those in the Highlands, where men
interacted mainly with men and women with women, a polygamous
household probably did not consist so much of a group of women all
vying for the attention of one man, as it did of a group of women
working and socializing with one another.
There is a telling flaw in these attempts to tout the supposed merits
of polygamy. If marriage is so necessary to a woman's security that
she will accept a role as a co-wife in order to get married, then that
woman is probably living in a society in which the sole access for
women to the necessities of life is through men, and that is not a
description of a society in which women have equal status or power.
Polygamy, like other customs, can foster either equality or
inequality, depending upon the nature of the culture in which the
custom occurs. As Murray and Kaganas point out, the existence of
polygyny in itself does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
women are less respected than men:
The concept of equality implies a comparison, and an assertion that
equality is denied suggests that one category of people enjoys
advantages that another category does not. But one can hardly

32

For a description of the reactions to the Governor-General's choice of a Lady, and a thorough
discussion of the law relating to polygamy today, see 0. Jessep, "The Governor-General's
Wives-Polygamy and the Recognition of Customary Marriage in Papua New Guinea," AustralianJournal
of Family Law 29-49 (1992).
"See, for example, C.R.M. Dlamini, "The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs," Acta
Juridica1991 (Capetown: Juta & Co., 1991) pp. 71-85.
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suggest seriously that feminist objections to polygyny would be
addressed if women were given the same opportunities as men to
accumulate spouses. The notion of a woman acting as wife to more
than one man suggests greater oppression, not liberation.34
Of course, the conclusion that multiple husbands oppress women
but multiple wives do not oppress men is correct only in a society in
which women are second-class citizens, suggesting again that customs
take their flavor, discriminatory or not, from the culture of which they
are a part.
In the Papua New Guinean Highlands, polygamy probably was part
of a cultural context that generally discriminated against women. In
those cultures in which women are presumed to be the equal of men,
polygamy can support that equality. Among the Navajo in North
America, for example, where women were recognized as tribal leaders
and landowners and made the important decisions about their own
lives, polygamy was adopted by women when it suited their purposes.
It did not contribute to women's having a lesser status. In their
excellent discussion of Navajo family law, the Zions point out that
Navajo women who entered into polygamous marriages were usually
sisters who wanted to stay together and support one another. 5
The response of the colonizers to polygamy is no indication of
whether it is discriminatory. The colonizers who frowned on polygamy
did not do so out of any great belief in female equality. Australia was
a patriarchal society itself. An Australian woman, although she was
her husband's only wife, was supposed to be his servant, helpmeet and
general factotum. The colonizers did not disdain polygamy because it
discriminated against women; they disliked polygamy because it was
unAustralian, unChristian, smacking of licentiousness and illicit
pleasure. They feared that it, like other Papua New Guinean customs,
would undermine the values (not to mention the economic system) they
were trying to implant in the colony. Although they did not outlaw
polygyny, they expected that it would wither away as Papua New
4

F. Kaganas and C. Murray, "Law, Women and the Family: the Question of Polygyny in a new South
Africa," Acta Juridica1991 (Capetown: Juta & Co., 1991) p. 116, 127.
"J.W. Zion and E.B. Zion, "Hozho's Sokee'-Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence under Navajo
Common Law," 25 Arizona State L.J 407-426 (1993).
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Guineans gradually came to accept the purported benefits of
civilization. And, it might be noted, the American colonizers were as
anxious to stamp it out amongst the Navajo as the Australians had been
to rid it from Papua New Guinea.
The issue for Wagi Non and many other women in Papua New
Guinea today is not whether the institution of polygyny discriminated
against women in pre-colonial times, but whether the practice of having
a town wife and a village wife harms women in contemporary Papua
New Guinean society. The problem for most women in such unions,
as the Wagi Non case demonstrates, is that men do it when they cannot
afford to, endangering the well-being of their wives. Wages are low
in Papua New Guinea compared to the costs of food and housing in the
towns. If a man is supporting a town wife, he is unlikely to have
anything left over for his village wife, who like Wagi Non, will be
forced to depend upon his relatives for the housing, food, and clothing
that she and her children need. Even though the National Court
probably has seen to it that his village wife does not run the risk of
prison, should she choose to deal with her difficult situation by finding
a new source of support, she still runs the risk of village censure.
Because her family has received a sizeable brideprice, she may not be
in a position simply to leave her marriage.
Women perhaps fear that the phenomenon of the town wife and
village wife cannot easily be eradicated because polygamy has such a
long history in Papua New Guinea. But this presumes that the current
practice springs from or is in some way related to the traditional
institution, and it may not be. Polygamy as part of Papua New
Guinea's traditional cultures is a perquisite of rural big men. The
current practice of bigamy is for the most part a stratagem of young
men (and women) coping with the exigencies and uprootedness of life
far from home in new towns that have yet to define a social ethics for
themselves. It has no more to do with traditional polygamy, which
was deeply intertwined with other aspects of clan culture, than do say,
the sexual mores of undergraduates in Sydney, London or New York.
VIII. Conclusions and Afterthoughts
There is a long simmering debate in Papua New Guinea over the
causes of and solutions to women's inequality. Is it a product of pre-
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colonial (and continuing) customary law? Those who argue that it is
point to customs such as polygamy, brideprice and arranged marriage,
virilocal residence, and the ownership of all property by the clan (in
effect, by the male big men or elders of the clan), which made women
seemingly the property of men. Others argue that inequality is the
product of colonial rule, which, patriarchal itself, tended to support and
rigidify the most patriarchal elements of custom. Finally, there are
those who insist that inequality is the product of Papua New Guinea's
contemporary political and economic situation, in which once beneficial
elements of custom become deleterious. All do agree, however, that,
despite the bow to equality contained in the Constitution, very little has
occurred since independence to improve women's status. Most
everything about custom that might interfere with the economic
successes of the elite of the new state has been modified or overturned,
but those aspects of custom that support the elite, such as the
continuing denial of equality to women, have been overlooked or
sustained.
In this context, the continuing willingness of state law to recognize
and uphold customary family law, while ignoring customary economic
rules, takes on new meaning. Since most women are consigned to the
realm of the family, they bear the burden of whatever inequality is
inherent in the continuation of customary rules of family life. By
invoking the Constitution to sort out a "family problem" in a traditional
village setting, J. Woods has put the National Court, for the first time,
squarely into the middle of the debate over the causes and solutions to
the inherent inequality of women in Papua New Guinean society today.
He has pitted state law (as embodied in the Constitution) against
custom at its source.
It is not clear, however, that what is in conflict in Wagi Non's
case actually is state law and customary law-at least, not customary
law as it existed in pre-colonial times. It may be that what is
happening in Wagi Non's case is that two newer versions of customary
law are in opposition-the customary law that has been devised in the
villages to meet changing needs and circumstances and the customary
law of the state courts.
Application of Wagi Non is an important case in the development
of Papua New Guinean law because it brings the question of women's
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place in Papua New Guinean society directly into judicial discourse for
what may be the first time. Women have been talking about, and
attempting to take action to remedy, their unequal status in Papua New
Guinean society since independence (and for some time before that),
but this may be the first case to take note of their arguments. I do not
know of any Papua New Guinea case other than those that concerned
the women imprisoned by Village Court orders that has invalidated a
customary rule on the basis that it conflicts with the Constitution's
requirements that women be treated equally. It is interesting that the
cases arose in a village context. The great majority of Papua New
Guinean women live traditional village lives; relatively few women
have obtained educations, paid employment and a flat or house in
town, yet one might nevertheless have expected the first major case to
come from the struggles of women in the towns, since it is they who
have been most vocal about the maltreatment of women in Papua New
Guinea today. That it did not illustrates the close links that still exist
between town and village women and the extent to which town women
have been able to give voice to their sisters in the village.
Since 1991, Village Courts in the Highlands seem to be
incarcerating fewer women for breaches of family law, but it is
difficult to know whether it is the Village Court magistrates or the
women ("don't try to leave him or you'll end up in jail") who got the
message. Meanwhile, the National Court finds itself embroiled in its
own sex discrimination problems. Recently, one of the judges of the
National Court (not one of those who had been instrumental in freeing
the incarcerated village women), sentenced a defendant to four years
at hard labor for carnal knowledge of the defendant's six-year-old
stepdaughter, explaining to the defendant that the problem was not his
yen for sex, it was his yen to have it with the wrong person: "If he
wanted sex, then I suppose he is entitled to rape his wife to satisfy his
desire for sex."

